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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000—

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

CaseNo.20100792-CA
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant and Appellant.
—000O000—

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(f).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial Court err in denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his guilty
plea in this matter, which was entered without his retained counsel, and without any
attempt by the Court or the parties to notify retained counsel of the proceedings.
This question came before the trial Court on Defendant's Motion for leave to
Withdraw his guilty plea.
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Does the Information and its supporting affidavit charge, on its face, a crime
of which Defendant could be found guilty? Defendant contends that the act of asking
for a controlled substance, when there is no evidence that such a substance exists, is
not a crime.
This question was raised in the trial Court by a Motion to Dismiss.
5. STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The standard or review on the Motion to Withdraw is that of an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) Cert, denied,
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
The issue of statutory construction is a question of law, to be reviewed for
correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial court's decision. See Landes
v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
AT ISSUE
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties
Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was
2
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obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal
responsibility.
(l)(a) A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person's conduct is
prohibited by law; and
(b)

(I) the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal
negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute
defining the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or
(ii) the person's acts constitute an offense involving strict liability.

(2) These standards of criminal responsibility do not apply to the violations set
forth in Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code, unless specifically provided by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102. Culpable mental state required - Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state,
and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state
and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable
mental state.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103. Definitions.
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
3
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conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-4-101. Attempt - Elements of offense:
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime
if he:
(a) engages in conduct constitution a substantial step toward
commission of a crime: and
(b) (I) intend to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that
result.
For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly
corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (1) (b).
(3) A defense to a crime does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was not actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed
them to be.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is a 57 year old African-American, charged with "attempted
possession or use of a controlled substance". The Information before the Court
charged:
ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
(558) 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) UCA, third degree felony as follows: That on of about
October 01, 2009 at 217 West 200 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah
the defendant did knowingly and intentionally attempt to possess or use a
controlled substance, to wit: cocaine a Schedule II substance and committed
the offense within 1000 feet of a place of worship.
He was charged as a 3 rd Degree Felony for attempting to possess cocaine, on October
1, 2009, enhanced in a "drug free zone".( R. 1). The following is the "affidavit of
probable cause" attached to the Information on file in the District Court:
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following:
The Statement of Salt Lake City Police Officer Hamideh, that on October 1,
2009, he was working undercover as a "dealer" at 271 West 200 South, Salt
Lake County, when the defendant here, HARRY MILLER approached him,
pulled out his money and asked for "rock" (cocaine). Shortly after, the
defendant was apprehended by other officer's [sic] and identified through
Hamideh as the "person" that attempted to buy the drugs.
NOTICE IS GIVEN that the offense was committed within 1000 feet of a place
of worship; therefore, the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty. LcL
At the time the Information was filed in this matter, Defendant resided in the

5
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State of Louisiana. Nevertheless, he appeared by counsel on October 30, 2009 ®. 4)
A Motion for Bill of Particulars was filed on November 9 (R. 11) Apparently, that
Motion was denied by the Court, in the form of a green "sticky tab" attached to the
front of Defendant's Request to Submit for Decision, containing the word "denied".
No attempt by the Court was made to communicate that denial to defense counsel.
(R14).
A Motion to Dismiss was filed with the Court on December 9, accompanied by
a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. The Motion and Memorandum
made the claim that, because possession of a drug is a "malum prohibitum" and strict
liability offense, the crime of "attempted possession" does not exist. (R 16 - 23) The
Motion was denied by a Minute Entry and Order, dated January 11, 2010 (R. 31). A
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was filed with this Court on January 21, 2010 (R.
40); and the Petition was denied on March 1, 2010. (R. 41)
Defendant returned to the State of Utah in July, 2010, and was shortly
thereafter arrested on a warrant from the District Court and arraigned before Hon.
Tyrone Medley on July 28,2010. The Minute Entry of that date states that Defendant
was advised of his right to counsel and appointed a Salt Lake Legal Defender (R. 47).
Defense counsel was not notified that his client was in custody or before the Court;
6
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and the record does not reflect that anyone in the Court that day was aware that
counsel had been retained. On August 3, 2010, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to
a Class A Misdemeanor of attempting to obtain possession of a controlled substance,
the enhancement having been dropped as part of a plea bargain. (R. 52,60) Defendant
was remanded to the County Jail, pending Sentencing on September 20,2010. Id On
September 14, one week before the Sentencing was to take place, private counsel,
having only recently become aware of the situation, filed a Motion to Withdraw the
guilty plea ( R. 69 - 71). At the Sentencing Hearing on September 20, 2010, the
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was denied and sentencing went forward.
Defendant was sentenced to time served, and was released. A Notice of Appeal was
filed on September 21.
This is not the first time that this Defendant has come before this Court. In
February, 2003, Defendant was arrested for aggravated robbery, a crime that was
alleged to have occurred in December of 2000. He was convicted by a Jury of
aggravated robbery in December, 2003; and on February, 2004, he was sentenced to
a period of from five (5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. He appealed his
conviction to this Court under Case No. 20040150. This Court remanded the matter
to the District Court for additional factual findings regarding the claim of ineffective
7
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assistance of counsel. No finding of ineffective assistance of counsel was made, but
on or about January 18,2007, the parties stipulated to Summary Reversal. On January
22, 2007, this Court remanded the case to the District Court for a new trial On July
3, 2007, the Salt Lake District Attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss charges; and on
July 6, 2007, Defendant was released from custody.
Thereafter, Defendant filed a Petition for a Determination of Actual Innocence,
seeking the payment of compensation, in the District Court. The District Court
dismissed the Petition, and the matter came again before this Court under Case No.
20080921. On November 19,2009, this Court reversed the dismissal of Mr. Miller's
Petition and remanded the matter for an Evidentiary Hearing on actual innocence to
the Salt Lake District Court. See Miller v. State, 2009 UT App 341 (Utah App. 2009).
That matter remains pending before the District Court.
Mr. Miller, as shown in previous actions before this Court, never finished high
school. He has maintained unskilled employment during the times he has not been
incarcerated; and he suffered a stroke around the time that he was accused of having
committed the crime in December, 2000. When he was brought before the District
Court on the instant allegations, he did not assert that he had previously had counsel
appear in his behalf, and he went along with the reduced plea, likely in the hope he
8
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would be released from jail. He was not; and he spent almost two (2) months in jail
prior to Sentencing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Trial Court committed error and abused its discretion in refusing to all
Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in this matter, entered without his retained
counsel present, and without the acknowledgment that there were legals issues which
counsel sought to appeal to this Court.
Defendant stands convicted of "attempted possession" of drugs which did not
exist. His allegedly criminal conduct consisted of offering to purchase non-existent
drugs from an undercover police officer. That does not constitute a crime, as there
can be no attempt in a crime which is one of strict liability; and the fact that the drugs
did not exist obviates any such attempt.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA; AS HE
WAS EFFECTIVELY DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND HIS RIGHT TO
CONTEST THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM.
Defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, as it was
made without the presence of his retained counsel, and without a full understanding
9
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of the legal position that this statute cannot be applied to Defendant. The withdrawal
of a guilty plea is within the discretion of the Court; but it is an abuse of discretion
if the plea was entered without a full understanding of Defendant's rights.

The

circumstances of Defendant's arrest and Court appearance, when taken in the context
of his background with Utah's criminal justice system, show that Defendant was
given an adequate opportunity to not entirely aware of his legal options. His retained
counsel was already fully involved in the case. Counsel had not only made an
Appearance, but had filed motions and even sought an Interlocutory Appeal.
Defendant was incarcerated; and at a disadvantage against the system that had already
wrongfully taken years of his freedom. He was appointed an attorney because
apparently the Court was unaware that he had counsel already. There is no record of
any discussion of the need for such an appointment. Obviously, the Court did not
review the file and take notice of the pleadings. Doing so would have at least
brought up the question as to whether he was represented; and the opportunity for
Defendant, the Court, or the Legal Defender, to at least check. Defendant may have
thought that the entry of the plea was the easiest way to get the matter over with. But
he was remanded to custody upon the representations of the prosecutor that his only
local tie was his nephew and that" I only show three incidents in the State of Utah,
10
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but it looks like one of which might have been a 1st Degree Felony robbery where he
did about three years in prison." (R. 82 p. 7). Defendant might be expected to speak
up for himself and remind the Court that he had a brother in Utah, not a nephew. And
certainly, he would be expected to speak up and tell the Court that the 1st Degree
Felony had long since been dropped. But he didn't, so he went to jail. In fact, if the
Court had known that he had private counsel in Utah, and that he had made all his
previous Court appearances exactly as ordered, he might have been released. But the
Court, for reasons that certainly are still not clear, knew none of these things. So,
Defendant was denied his private counsel and denied release.
At the sentencing hearing, his private counsel appeared and moved to withdraw
the guilty plea( R. 83 p. 2). The situation was explained to the Court, which replied:
Well, there's nothing in the record here that shows that. It just shows he was
appointed an attorney, and there's no indication of any kind of withdrawal or
anything. If someone hadn't told Judge Medley, all he's looking at is the
Information. So he wouldn't know that you represented him. (Emphasis
added) (R. 83 p. 4).

There was a brief discussion as to why the Court should allow the plea to be
withdrawn. The Court stated first: "Well, I guess we'd have to have a hearing."
Then, without giving an opportunity for the hearing, the Court abruptly changed its

li
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mind: "Well, that's your position, but he pled to it and I'm going to - 1 accepted the
plea." And then: "No. Im not going to allow him to withdraw his plea." ®. 83 p. 6).
Sentencing went forward as scheduled; and this appeal followed.
In State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988) Cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), the Court of Appeals cited Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 which
states that pleas may only be withdrawn upon good cause shown. And, the Court
noted, that an appellate court may only order that a plea be withdrawn when it clearly
appears that the trial court abused its discretion. kL At 93. Defendant claims that the
denial of his access to his private counsel, after his counsel had been substantially
involved in this matter rendered his plea not fully informed or voluntary. The Court's
refusal to actually hold the hearing that it said would be necessary, at which
Defendant might testify of his reasons for "going with the flow" and not "putting up
a fuss", is an abuse of discretion.
Both the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I § 12 of the Utah
Constitution guarantee the right to counsel in criminal cases. While it is true that this
Defendant was not deprived of counsel per se. he was deprived of the counsel that
was already working on his case. And he was deprived of counsel who knew
something about his long struggle with the Utah justice system - someone who could
12
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have at least told the trial Court that the First Degree Felony that appeared on his
record had been reversed and dismissed. As such, he was deprived of very important
support which clearly would have resulted in a different result in the Trial Court. The
Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, fn. 25 (Utah 1980), quoted
the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,225 (1967) and
ruled that both the Sixth Amendment and Art. I, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution
require representation at all "critical" phases of prosecution "where the results might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial to a mere formality.
Defendant, furthermore, is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.
Defendant does not here claim that his appointed public defendant did not do her job;
but he does claim that the assistance of counsel was ineffective, given the
circumstances. The public defender was not told that Defendant had private counsel;
and she was not told about the motion to dismiss or the Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal. If she had been, there is little doubt that her advice would not be to take a
quick plea. She would have been bound by the Code of Professional; Responsibility
to inform the Court that Defendant was already represented, and that a continuance
would need to be granted to get private counsel into court. The Utah Supreme Court,
in State v. Ott 2010 UT 1,

P.2d

, § 22 (Utah 2010)recently held that trial
13
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counsel's failure to object to important evidence introduced at sentencing would
constitute ineffective assistance. The standard, the Court held, is:
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show: (1) that
counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a reasonable
probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have
obtained a more favorable outcome.
Once again, Defendant is not casting aspersions on the quality of legal services
provided by the public defender. It was, however, not possible for the public
defender to provide adequate legal services without knowledge of previous
proceedings in the case. Defendant further acknowledges that whether there was a
reasonable probability of a better result is controlled by whether the Court rules in his
favor in the second part of this appeal. It is, however, necessary in order to bring the
question of statutory construction before this Court to first address the validity of the
entry of a plea which clearly would have been advice of his private counsel.
The simple fact remains that Defendant was denied the counsel of his choice;
and he was not given the opportunity to weigh his alternatives and decide how to
proceed. Further, the trial Court refused to hold a hearing to determine if the plea
should be allowed to be withdrawn.

The trial Court abused its discretion; and it

should be reversed.

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINTII
THE UNDERLYING CRIME IS A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSE; AND THERE
WERE NO DRUGS. THERE MAY BE NO "ATTEMPT".
Defendant is charged with "attempted possessions of a controlled substance",
ostensibly in violation of the Utah Controlled Substance Act, Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(2)(a)(I) which states that "it is unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled
substance

" Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a), a possession in a "drug free

zone" is enhanced by one (1) degree. Under this statutory scheme, mere possession
of a controlled substance is unlawful, providing it is knowing and intentional. The
statutory scheme does not include "attempted possession". Possession with intent to
distribute, however, is a more serious crime. In order to be convicted of that crime,
the Defendant does not have to actually distribute the drugs. He merely has to exhibit
the intent, including possession of a quantity that would normally not be for
personally use; or possession in connection with certain paraphernalia which are
indicia of distribution, such as scales, bags and other production material. The
Information in this matter charges a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I),
but the language of the Information does not track the statute; and nothing in the

15
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statute prohibits the conduct charged.
Defendant acknowledges that the Utah Criminal Code, in Utah Code Ann. §
76-4-101 and 102 defines attempt, and punishes it one (1) degree lower than the
principal crime. Defendant claims, however, that this statute does not apply here.
This is a crime involving only knowing and intentional possession. No additional
mens rea is attached to this crime. The crime is basically malum prohibitum, rather
than malum in se. While an argument can be made for the fact that possession of a
harmful drug might have a victim outside of the possessor, that is not an argument
present here. Defendant is merely charged with walking up to an undercover police
officer, and telling him that he would like some drugs. There were no drugs; and there
was no possibility that Defendant would end up possessing any. Defendant claims
that such a statement is protected speech under the First Amendment. Only the actual
act of taking into possession a prohibited substance is prohibited by statute. The
expression of a desire to do so, is not. At any rate, the information is fatally defective,
in that it does not cite any statutory authority for the crime of "attempt".
A review of Utah Court decisions on the crime of "attempted possession" of
a controlled substance, show several appeals from such convictions. Those appeals,
however, were on evidentiary matters, after a conditional guilty plea was entered. In
16
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each case, the charge of "attempted possession" was a reduction from the original
possession charge, as the result of a plea bargain. See State v. Lee. 863 P.2d 49 (Utah
App. 1993); State v. Biggs. 2007 UT App 261 (Utah App. 2007); State v .Brake. 2002
UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31, (Utah App. 2002); and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah
App. 1993). Such an "attempted possession" is a convenient "legal fiction" and a way
for a Defendant to enter a guilty plea and gain some advantage over a straight plea to
the original charge. This case, however, is brought as an original charge, with no
evidence whatsoever that any drugs actually existed. Defendant's position that drugs
actually must exist for their to be attempt to possess them is bolstered by the
alternative term: "to possess or use a controlled substance". Certainly, the substance
cannot be "used" if it does not exist, and the fact that there is no drug would seem to
preclude someone from attempting to "use" it. Likewise, the absence of the drug
should prevent someone from attempting to possess it.
It is of great importance that the drugs did not exist. When a person is arrested
for possession of drugs, he is not asked whether he knew what he had, or what he
intended to do with, the drugs. If a substance that turns out to be drugs is in his
possession, it is assumed that he knew what it was; and that is enough. If, however,
a test shows that the substance is not a controlled substance, the charges are dropped,
17
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as there is no evidence of a crime. It does not matter that he might have thought they
were drugs, or that he hoped that they were drugs. If there are no drugs, there is no
crime. And, if there are no drugs, there is no evidence of attempt either.

Other

types of crimes include attempts specifically within the prohibited conduct; for
instance, prostitution. The act of selling sex, is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1302; and patronizing a prostitute is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1303.
Perhaps to make it easier for an undercover police officer to obtain evidence, merely
soliciting another for a sex act for hire is made a separate crime by Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-10-1313. Likewise, it is unlawful under Federal Law to "entice or persuade" a
minor into sexual activity, using means of interstate communications, such as
telephones or the internet. See 18 U.S.C § 2422. Thus, the act of talking about it is
enough, under some circumstances; and it does not even matter that the "minor" is an
undercover police officer.

See United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir.

2005). There is no similar statute at issue here.
Further, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5A-1 et seq., it is unlawful to possess
child pornography. The statute, however, states, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5A-3(4):
It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating this section that no person
under 18 years of age is actually depicted in the visual depiction or used in
producing or advertising the visual depiction.
18
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That affirmative defense effectively negates the crime of attempted
exploitation, in a case similar to this one. The material has to actually be there; and
it has to involve an actual minor. If it does not, it is not a crime, even if the person in
the depiction looks young, and might be mistaken for a minor. That is exactly the
same situation here. There were no drugs; and they could not be possessed. The crime
charged, in the form charged, does not exist.
Additionally, the crime here was originally enhanced by the allegation that the
"attempt" was in a "drug free zone". Clearly, this law is designed to prohibit the
presence of drugs in certain areas, near where children congregate, or in other
sensitive areas. Certainly it has not been made unlawful to talk about drugs in the
same area. There never were any drugs in that area; and there was any possibility of
danger to anyone in that area. Conceptually, this enhancement makes even less sense
than the underlying charge. While the enhancement was dismissed as part of the
alleged plea bargain, its presence was intimidating to Defendant, who did not wish
to risk a felony conviction. Further, the enhancement shows the folly of using the
attempt statute in this circumstance. In order for an enhancement to occur, a person
does not need to intend to possess or use a controlled substance near a "place of
worship" or other qualifying circumstance. The person does not even have to know
19
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that they are in a "drug free zone". That can be pointed out by the officer after the
fact; and

the officer can even bring about the enhancement on his own, by

maneuvering the Defendant into a drug free zone. In the recent case of State v.
Talbot, 2010 UT App 352 (Utah App. 2010), a conviction of possession of drugs in
a drug free zone was affirmed with almost no discussion. The appeal was brought on
the question of whether the search that produced the drugs was valid. When this
Court ruled that it was, the discussion was over. No proof was necessary for this
conviction to be upheld other than that he had the drugs, and that he was close to
something that created the enhancement. This is as close as something can get to a
strict liability offense. Thus, if he DID NOT have the drugs, he would not be guilty
of either the base offense nor the enhancement. This Defendant did NOT have any
drugs; and thus the prosecution fails.
CONCLUSION
Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the crime of
"attempted possession" of drugs; and the charges should be dismissed. No drugs
were involved; and the act of asking for what did not exist is not a violation of the
law. Further, because no intent is necessary, other than knowing possession, there is
no requisite mens rea such that the crime of attempted possession could be
20
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committed.
DATED this _ T day of February, 2011.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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and correct copies of the above and foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to the Utah
Attorney General, Appeals Division, PO Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
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In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
Salt Lake Department, State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,

|

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
Case No. 091908376
vs.

:

HARRY MILLER,

j

Defendant.

Judge William W. Barrett

I

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the attempt statute does not apply in
this case. The, State filed it's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
I agree with the position taken by the State of Utah, and tlierefore, the Morion to
Dismiss is denied. This shall constitute the Court's order.

Dated

ijlijlo
11 U/

(O

By the Court: ^
/

/

/I

•jjJ/ffljLfo
District Court Judge
i,, v ^ t t
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INITIAL APPEARANCE
NOTICE

vs.
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

Case No: 091908376 FS
Judge:
TYRONE E. MEDLEY
Date:
July 28, 2010

PRESENT
Clerk:
micheldb
Prosecutor: BROWN, CATHERINE E
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
n©afce of birth: September 19, 1953
Video
Tape Number:
s31
Tape Count: 934
CHARGES
1.- ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OR USE OF"A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
Degree Felony

3rd

INITIAL APPEARANCE
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
The Information is read.
Adyised of charges and penalties.
The defendant is advised of right to counsel.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Salt Lake Legal
Defenders to represent the defendant.
Appointed Counsel:
Name:
Address :
City:Phone:

Salt Lake Legal Defenders
424 ES&S ' 500 SoiitfeviSixlite #101
Salt Lake City UT 84111
532-5444

Affidavit of indigency is to be submitted by the defendant
Instructions to the defendant:
1. You are to immediately contact and consult with appointed
counsel.
2. You are to' cooperate with the appointed counsel in the defense
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Page
1
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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Case No: 091908376 Date:

Jul 28, 2010

of this case.
3. You are to keep appointed counsel advised at all times of an
address and a telephone number where you can be reached..
4. Attorney's fees for services of counsel may be assessed at the
time of sentence.
DRUG ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 08/03/2010
Time: 09:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - W.4 6
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
45 0 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Page
2 (last)
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

3RD DlST^^^litJURT - SALT LAKE
SALT I A K E I C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA

vs .
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

Case No: 091908376'FS
KATE'TOOMEY
Judge:
August
3, 2010
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 19, 1953
Video
Tape Number:
S 34
Tape Count- 12.45
CHARGES
1.' ATTEMPTED,POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
- Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/03/2010 Guilty
Court advises, defendant, of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time, for sentence.
Anpre- sentence iiiyest igation * was ordered..
Tlle.:Judge orders Adult /Probatiori & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence
report..
Change of Plea Note
Based upon, state.'s.motion ana pursuant to plea agreement, amend
charge to MA - Attempted POCS: Defendant pled guilty to amended
charge. •
HEARING
Motion,fot -Pretrial release is Denied.
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived prelin
This case is'bound ovei
9:00 AM in courtroom W:

st-ate consenting thereto.
as been set on 9/20/2010 at
ore Judge WILLIAM W. BARRETT.
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Case No: 091908376 Date:
Date

A^v
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••'Aug. 03, 2010

znai*

CATE TOOMEY
D i s t r i c t Court.
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3RD DISTRICT^COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

Case N o : 091908376 FS
Judge.:
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Date:.
September 20, 2010

PRESENT
Clerk:
debbiep
Prosecutor: STANGER, CRAIG N ,
Defendant
Defendant's A t t o r n e y ( s ) : MCCULLOUGH, W ANDREW
DEFENDANT. INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 19, 1953
Audio
-,\'..;.^>VVTape Number:
CR W3 9 " Tape 'Count: 10:26&10:44
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
- Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/03/2010 Guilty
SENTENCE JAIL
.•
:
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION, OR USE
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to .'a"term of 1 year(s) The total time suspended for this
charge is 1 y e a r ( s ) .
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is. placed on probation for 18.month(s) .
Probation is"-to-be. supervised by Salt Lake Co Probation Service.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required b y Salt Lake County
Probation Services*
Violate no laws."
Enter,, participate in, . and complete, any .program, counseling or
treatment as directed b y proba,tion/agency. H
Comply with all standard" dtu'g '&'alcohol ^conditions imposed by
probation agency.
;.: ./? • '• \
Do- not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; rior
associate with any persons using, possessing.or consuming alcohol
or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place wnere drugs are used, sold or otherwise
distributed illegally.^
• :
Submit to breath'and/or urine, testing for drugs or alcohol upon the
request of any. law, enforiertie^
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Library,'Page
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Case No: 091908376 Date:

, Sep 20, 2010

w^Jfe'l

Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the
chief item of sale.
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any
recommended treatment.
Complete 4 0 Hrs Comm Service by 9-20-11

Deft appeared in Custody. 'Defense. Motion to v/ithdr;
Plea i s denied, Sentencirig'vto gp forwarc^ today
Withdraw as Co^rjsel # is granted".1' Dei:t^js$
Date:

f

'

~""

wESEE&M

'D^stticC
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-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY
Plaintiff,

)

vs

Case No. 091908376

HARRY MILLER,
Defendant.

)

ORIGINAL

Sentencing
Electronically Recorded on
September 20, 2010

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE WILLIAM BARRETT
Third District Court Judge
APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

Craig N. Stanger
255 N. Admiral Byrd Rd.
SLC, UT 84116
Telephone: (801)326-5703

For the Defendant:

W. Andrew McCullough
6885 S. State St. #200
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801)565-0894

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

NOV 2 3 2010

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT

%OI0O I^X CA

152 Katresha Street
Grantsville, UT 84029
Telephone: (435) 884-5515

HIED DISTKI&r COUfil
Third Judicial District
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Deputy ClerkT

i
-5will disagree.

What I'd like to do is convert it so a Sery, but

that would require the State's concurrence, and they're not going
to concur.

His brother is here, your Honor.

He's got a job.

What I really need you to do is not only let me withdraw the
guilty plea, but let him out.
THE COURT:
being held on

Well, I can't let him out.

He's already

—

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
know, obviously not —

Well, right, pending —

I mean, you

you can only do what you can do.

South

Salt Lake has got a hold, and we'll have to deal with South Salt
Lake.

His brother is here.

a job to go to.

He's got a place to live.

He's got

Your Honor, I've represented this guy for years.

He'll come to court.

If you fully understood his mess with the

system, the system has messed with him, you'd be pretty
sympathetic.
THE COURT:

Well, I'm not sure I'm opposed to releasing

him to pre-trial.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, in that case we want to withdraw

the guilty plea, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. STANGER:

Well, I guess we'd have to have a hearing.
I don't know that Counsel's motion to

withdraw the guilty plea addresses the necessary (inaudible).
THE COURT:
MR. STANGER:
THE COURT:

Well, I guess the problem
—
Yeah.

—

what makes it (inaudible).
Well, that's —

it is a problem
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-6because he was represented by an attorney and we went through the
colloquy with him and we have —

she went through the long form

with him.
MR. MCCULLOUGH:
THE COURT:

I understand that, your Honor, but

—

And then he entered his plea.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

The crime to which he pled does not

exist.
THE COURT:

Well, that's your position, but he pled to

it and I'm going to —

I accepted the plea.

So unless you can

convince me that the appellate court in a written opinion is
going to say that it's —
MR. MCCULLOUGH:

there's no such crime, he's stuck.
Well, they are going to say that, your

Honor, if you'll give them a chance.
THE COURT:
withdraw his plea.

No.

I'm not going to allow him to

What do you want to do about sentencing?

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
going to

No.

That's a final decision?

You're not

—
THE COURT:

That's correct.

MR. MCCULLOUGH:

Well, in that case we'll go ahead with

sentencing today, your Honor.
seen the report?

I've seen

the report.

Have you

Could I have a few minutes with him in the

back?
THE COURT:

Do you have a copy of it?

MR. MCCULLOUGH:
MR. STANGER:

I don't, but thank you.

Judge, I have a —

I'm covering the Rees
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